The authors discuss the space that can be found for restorative justice in decisions on human rights issues in the criminal procedure by the European Court of Human Rights, based on par. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. There is room for restorative justice because the court accepts the waiver of the procedural rights and safeguards by the defendant, provided that he does so completely voluntarily, after being fully informed, and provided that there is no important public interest that stands in the way of out-of-court settlements. The alternative procedure to a full dressed criminal trial should, in addition, live up to such standards that the procedure can be judged fair. Pressures on avoiding unreasonable delay and legal counseling necessary to fully inform the defendant about his options can lead to a formalization of restorative procedures which can be a threat to the merits of restorative justice.

The author responds to Huysmans and Verbruggen by stressing the importance of recognizing that the criminal procedure has aims, which are entirely different from the aims of restorative procedures. If things can be so arranged that the criminal justice system provides for a structural place and use of restorative procedures, these should and could be guided by different rights and safeguards, which fit and reinforce the different aims of restorative justice and promote their justice qualities. Initial legal studies to develop suitable procedural rights and safeguards for restorative justice have been produced and should be elaborated upon.

Social (re-)integration is such a complex phenomenon that it is not possible to make a direct link between restorative justice and social reintegration of offenders. If one considers restorative justice, not in its utility for maintaining the law but as a praxis of social work, one could get the impression that restorative justice runs the risk of individualizing the social problem of crime by making offenders responsible and of losing sight of the structural dimensions causing or contributing to criminality. The same structural dimensions may appear to be a blockade for effective emancipation of offenders from their often marginal and powerless positions. Considered as a praxis of social work, restorative justice should be able to promote (the awareness of) accountability and the mutual exploration of the many roads that can lead to effective emancipation and reintegration.

Responding to Bouverne-De Bie and Roose Walgrave stresses the importance of using a narrow definition of restorative justice as a way of doing justice by repairing the harm caused by crime. This narrow definition alone allows for the development of a consistent praxis and theory of restorative justice and for adequate research of its effects. Restorative Justice cannot offer the ´politically critical´ social praxis on the interface between the public and the private world that Bouverne-De Bie and Roose would like to see. But the apparent influence that basic concepts and ideas of restorative justice have on social practices outside the sphere of criminal justice imply that such social practices and restorative justice praxis can work in the same direction by avoiding stigmatization and exclusion and promoting redress and inclusion.

The author, reflecting upon both Bouverne-De Bie & Roose and Walgrave, deplores to some degree the fact that the Journal for Restorative Justice, from its foundation, has narrowed its focus and scope by making it a priority to attempt to influence the criminal justice system. Most of the conflicts and troubles between citizens never reach the criminal agencies and are dealt with by other methods, such as methods of social work, without approaching the police. The potential scope for influencing conflict-behavior is therefore immensely greater outside the sphere of the criminal law.

The author advises the protagonists of restorative justice to become less paradigmatic and more pragmatic in their approach of criminal justice and victims needs and interests. The offer of a restorative procedure is not suitable for all victims, nor for all thinkable moments after the event of a crime. Tailoring is needed to make each victim the best offer, and the utility of restorative justice is important, but limited. The author believes that much of the restorative justice literature is aiming at proving the superiority of restorative justice practices above any other type of intervention or service, and he feels that this is partly why restorative justice has not been well received in the Netherlands. A piecemeal implementation of mediation and conferencing in the sphere of criminal justice might be served by being less paradigmatic.

Blad responds to Groenhuijsen by showing how political decisions in the Netherlands, after successful experiments with restorative justice for juveniles and adults, were based on the belief that criminal justice would lose its punitive foundation and tenor when restorative justice practices would become integrated in the justice system. Criminal justice should not be about resolving conflicts between victims and offenders and the type of mediation, that could lead to an agreement as an important element to be considered in sentencing, was therefore rejected. In so far as restorative justice ideology took influence, it seems to have been a misconception of restorative justice as merely a new form of penal abolitionism. The fact that restorative justice does not deny the legitimacy of the provisions in the substantive criminal law and that all important restorative projects co-operate with criminal justice agencies was apparently ignored. Against the background of the dominant political culture of ‘punitive populism’ and intensified use of severe punishments it seems highly unlikely that abandoning the ambition to develop a restorative justice paradigm would further the implementation of restorative justice.

Conceptions of what ethics are about inform the expectations one has when consulting ethicians. To illustrate this Pattyn shows how two different conceptions of ethics generate two opposite expectations. One could either consider ethics as a specific disciplinary domain that can evaluate and judge decisively about a certain phenomenon on the basis of fundamental criteria, or see ethics as the study of the ways in which a phenomenon – such as restorative justice – can appear as a morally accountable praxis in a specific cultural setting or ‘situated understanding’. Pattyn argues that only the second view makes sense and discusses several types of settings and understandings in relation to various types of judicial settlement. The conclusion following from the analysis is that the ambitions of restorative justice amount to an everyday moral strategy to heal the damaged cohesion of social groups after a transgression and to offer offender and victim alike the opportunity to rehabilitate.

Van Stokkom endorses Pattyn’s criticism of principled ethics. It is more convincing to view ethics as a way to understand moral practices and moral experiences. For example, the ethical value of restorative justice practices resides in moral communication in which the participants strive for recognition. Nevertheless, Pattyn does not notice that moral justifications often rely on ethical principles. When we must make choices or introduce new policies, we often cannot escape justifications that fit in with ethical principles. Nevertheless, these principles may also paralyze or polarize discussions. In populist times – with its punitive rhetoric – it seems wise to keep public discussion at bay from ‘high restorative principles’ such as the ‘superfluity of punishment’ and concentrate on the narrative power of restorative justice practices.

Victim-offender-mediation started in Belgium as early as 1993 and nowadays the Belgium landscape shows a variety of restorative practices, including conferencing with juveniles and mediation with adult offenders, on the basis of a number of legal arrangements. Progress can still be made in quantitative terms and qualitatively by harmonizing the various legal instruments that are available. The diversionary mediation that is possible at the level of the public prosecutor differs in a number of ways from the mediation that can be offered in subsequent stages of the criminal procedure. A variety of motives and reasons explain the reception and growth of restorative practices, such as the desire to offer victims a better service and to improve the delivery of justice. The willingness to experiment and to collaborate between protagonists of restorative justice and the agencies of criminal justice, and the strong scientific support from the Catholic University of Leuven, are amongst the key factors that promoted the integration and consolidation of restorative practices in the legal system.

Comparing the developments in the Netherlands with those in Belgium the authors find important differences relating to the questions pertinent to implementation. Experiments have also been done in the Netherlands and their evaluations showed positive results, but there were different models which were not clearly – or not at all – related to the traditional criminal justice process. They all were lacking the formal collaboration with the courts, that was seen in Belgium. There has been no form of central direction and no important influence from the academic world and the various projects have officially been replaced in 2006 by a national policy of implementing ‘victim-offendertalks’. These talks have their merits and are appreciated by victims and offenders, but they do not amount to mediation in a restorative style, since restorative agreements are not allowed to result. Nevertheless, there are a number of indications that restorative justice practices could still become recognized and accepted. Staff of the police, the public prosecutors office and judges are interested and new experiments are beginning. The new development of local ‘veiligheidshuizen’ (‘front offices for safety’) offers a promising setting for interagency co-operation and conferencing with citizens in trouble and conflict. The conferencing-model has gained broad acceptance in the context of juvenile care and may continue to inspire justice personnel. In process now is the foundation of a new restorative justice network, called ‘Restorative Justice Netherlands’.