Legislation affects restorative justice in four ways: existing legislation may allow it, new laws may enable it, laws may limit it, or restorative justice may be the norm. Examples from different countries are given and specific questions about the relationship of restorative justice to the criminal justice system discussed. It is suggested that, broadly speaking, safeguards should be legislated and practice regulated by an independent body. It is concluded that restorative practices, have the potential to transform society’s response to harmful behaviour.

Evaluative studies show that victims are generally satisfied with their participation in a restorative intervention, even when concerning violent crime. Therefore, we don’t have to ask whether restorative justice should be offered to victims of crime, but how it should be offered. Using the victimological literature, we explore the appropriateness of two opposing models with regard to the offer in violent crime cases. The protective model, as for instance endorsed by victim support services in Québec, is based on the concern for the protection of vulnerable victims. The proactive model, as inscribed in the 2005 law on the general offer of mediation in Belgium, is based on the informed consent principle. Both models respect the needs of victims, while ranking these needs differently. The available empirical and theoretical observations on the subject do not unilaterally support or reject either model. We, therefore, present a complementary, albeit theoretical model, i.e. the integration of the invitation to a restorative intervention within victim support services.

Discussions in the movement of restorative justice about the fundamental question, whether its interventions are alternatives to punishment or alternative punishments, have become repetitive and seem to be in a dead end. The author reviews the arguments against the background of the ‘last resort’ principle in Husak’s work. Husak distinguishes between last resort in terms of sentencing and last resort in terms of criminalization. Since the restorative justice movement does not fundamentally reject the primary criminalisations, but accepts the definitions of certain forms of conduct as crime, it merely strives to offer alternatives to punishments that would otherwise be imposed. If protagonists of restorative justice want to avoid this, they should consider an abolitionist option to strive for decriminalization.