This article discusses the way in which nominally liberal, secular political parties in the Netherlands refer to religion when describing Dutch national identity with particular emphasis on controversies surrounding the 2017 parliamentary elections. Focussing on the currently ruling liberal party VVD and the populist right-wing party PVV, appeals on ‘judeo-christian roots’ and the importance of christian symbols are analyzed against the backdrop of larger currents of religious-secular developments in (inter)national political discourse. The author suggest using the term ‘postsecular nationalism’ to describe this development. The article ends with speculation on the impact of postsecular nationalism for policy-makers.

This article explores three perspectives of tradition and their consequences for the relationship between law and religion. A religious tradition can be seen either as a remnant of the past, separate from modern law, or as an authoritative source of moral prescriptions. The analysis of a literary tradition demonstrates that traditions influence each other and develop in a cyclical way. Tradition comes about as a construction by the present of the past. This third perspective shows the importance of the acknowledgment of law as an open platform for deliberation and recognition of religious values.

The term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ dates from the second half of the twentieth century, but has of recent gained in popularity with politicians and policy makers. It seems to be no coincidence that this has a direct correlation with the debates on the position of Islam in Europe. This article is a critical assessment of the meanings of the various elements of this term: what is so Christian about European civilization, what is Judaism’s part therein, and what role does the Islam play? It is notable that one often considers this Judeo Christian ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’ as an uninterupted historical proces, while the second half of the twentieth century shows a clear rupture when it concerns values or the experience of religion. Also remarkable is that one often fails to make the differentiation between religion as a theological cult and as a culture carrier, or between the principles and the practice of a religion. As a consequence, the term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ or ‘culture’ is being used in a very sloppy or selective manner, often with the purpose to exclude Islam.

The Dutch freedom to set up schools has become illusory. The foundation standards (the number of students) are high and the current interpretation of the concept of direction (religion or philosophy of life) does not seem to be sufficiently connected with today’s pluriform society. The alternative of direction-free planning of schools had practical and fundamental objections. Parent statements are insufficiently reliable and a school without direction does not have a foundation. An extension of direction is neither without disadvantages: the government will have to test whether there is a sufficiently coherent concept to be able to count as a direction.

Recently the Dutch parliament passed a law that provides the subsidy for religious and humanist education in state schools. The law on primary education gives to the parents the right to ask for it. Religious education in state schools exists in the Netherlands since the beginning of the 19th century, optional and taught by representatives of the church. So it is appropriate for the state school which wish to be a school for everyone. And public funding is appropriate in the Dutch education system.

Two new rulings by the European Court of Human Rights confirm earlier jurisprudence regarding the ‘burqa ban’, as such ban is justified on the basis of the principle of ‘living together’. Still, two points stand out in these rulings that need discussion. The first is that this is an example of how the Court applies its new ‘qualitative, democracy-enhancing approach’ that pays more consideration to domestic decision-making in the field of human rights. These rulings show the flipside of this laudable endeavour, however, as the Court sees no reason to evaluate, let alone critically assess, the outcome of these domestic decision-making processes. Second, the remarkable ‘concurring opinion’ by the president of the ruling judges, in which he states in very stern wordings that the ruling should not be considered a cart blanche for burqa bans elsewhere. Given the elaborate considerations why such ban would not be admissible, it is surprising that the Court has failed to elaborate why the burqa bans in France and Belgium are admissible.