As an approach to law and justice, restorative justice focuses squarely on addressing human needs; it acknowledges the equal dignity of all parties, irrespective of their role in the harmful act; it accepts responsibilities for addressing the disadvantages or inequities that crime has bequeathed to victims and that often have contributed to offending on the part of the perpetrator; and it derives its creative potential from the shared vulnerability and reciprocal exchange of concern that occurs through respectful face-to-face encounter. Therefore restorative justice constitutes a relational justice of care.

This article outlines two points of criticism related to Christopher Marshall’s discussion of a relational justice of care. First, addressing the needs of the parties involved in a criminal justice case finds its appropriate place in the post-trial stage. In the pre-trial and trial stages, protecting the legal rights and equal treatment of suspects should take priority over caring for suspects. Secondly, if the outcome of the restorative encounter in the pre-trial stages has a bearing on the verdict of the judge, the encounter may risk to lose its authenticity. The offender may have reason to believe that a socially appropriate performance will be rewarded with less punishment.

This article considers Christopher D. Marshall’s proposal to draw a connection between the ethics of care and restorative justice. The ethics of care tradition is critical of the modern liberal interpretation of morality as a rational endeavor based on universal principles. The article attempts to spell out the ethical and political implications of adopting this fundamental viewpoint in the context of restorative justice. On the ethical level, the ethics of care may remind the tradition of restorative justice of its essential reliance on the concrete moral practices and competences of people that precede any conceptualized normative ethics. On the political level, an ethics of care approach to restorative justice seems to lead to a certain deadlock in that it fails (and refuses) to offer a rational justification of restorative justice practices. On a closer look, the ethics of care can provide such a justification, be it a ‘communitarian’ one.

Christopher Marshalls is convinced that restorative justice has to do with care for relational involvement. That view is intuitively convincing but not particularly clear. Recent psychological and philosophical research has recently devoted much attention to notions such as ‘collective intentionality’ (Searle, Tomasello) and ‘joint commitment’ (Gilbert). This kind of research is situated and discussed in this paper. We indicate how the restoration of mutual involvement can be reinterpreted from the perspective of this research. This exercise shows that caring for relationships should not be interpreted in a sentimental way. In law and in restorative justice, it does not have to be the intention to enter into more personal relationships with each other. Rather, it is the intention to make it possible once again to develop mutual understanding, respect and compassion from our common universal human commitment.

This paper examines moral injury, in relation to recovery from this kind of psychic damage and to restorative justice. In recent research the concept is developed in distinction from the psychiatric diagnosis PTSD. Whereas PTSD is rooted in anxiety, as it occurs during or after life-threatening situations, people suffering from moral injury are disruptively affected by guilt and shame, in the slipstream of which they may be tormented by remorse, self-loathing, anger and self-disgust – with symptoms similar to PTSD. Unlike PTSD, however, the risk of moral injury is part of ordinary life. It may happen to anyone. Therefore, this paper takes an ‘existential’ perspective by relating moral injury to the fundamental human condition of relationality. Moral injury is interpreted as the disturbance of the responsibility, the confidence and the security that fundamentally sustain the human relationships to the world, to each other, and to oneself. One way of recovering from moral injury is through empathy, primarily performed by caregivers or chaplains who guide the morally injured, and consequently accomplished by the injured themselves, in a narrative way.

In this article, we report on our initial findings (from the field) regarding conflict resolution among the Maroons in Suriname. After first providing some background information about the Maroons (section 2), we describe their manner of conflict resolution after a crime has taken place and we explain what justice within this context entails for them (section 3). Subsequently, we try to distil ‘the useful elements’ from the Maroons’ approach to crime, that is to say elements with which modern restorative justice, i.e. restorative justice that meets, inter alia, human rights and constitutional requirements, can be nourished and strengthened. We also discuss some of the challenges we have encountered, where the traditional legal system and the modern criminal justice system come together (section 4). Then we try to build some possible bridges between the two legal systems (section 5). The contribution concludes with providing a window on the future of the development of restorative justice in Suriname and the Netherlands.