The dangerous asylum seeker easily captures the public's attention. Policies increasingly focus on strong repercussions for asylum seekers who cause disturbances or can be considered dangerous. This article distinguishes between categories of asylum seekers based on the kind of disturbance or danger they cause in the view of the general public. It is argued that EU law provides a strong basis for denying or withdrawing the residence rights of asylum seekers based on public order considerations. In practice however, it seems difficult to meet the threshold of the public order criteria developed by the Court of Justice.

In recent years, migration has been at the centre of European debates and the number of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean remains alarming. To this day, hundreds of people continue to risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean on small boats in order to flee conflict zones, persecution or extreme poverty. However, due to the lack of legal alternatives, migrants engage in dangerous journeys and find themselves helpless in the hands of smugglers. This article will address the growing pattern of criminalisation of migration and humanitarian assistance throughout Europe and consider the extent to which national, European and international anti-smuggling laws affect the work of civil society actors.

In the Netherlands, the penalization of human smuggling has become broader and more severe. This development is part of a crimmigration trend that describes an increase of immigration-related criminal offenses. Currently, the provision does not include a financial component, nor does it exclude acts with a humanitarian motive. The validity of such severe prohibitions, especially those including acts that are not morally reprehensible, is questioned through the concept of ‘humanitarian smuggling’. Moral reprehensibility is one of the criteria for criminalization that provide a framework for the reflection on the Dutch prohibition of human smuggling that is conducted in this article.

Judgements rendered in the accused’s absence form a special category of criminal judgements that undoubtedly do not provide for the same safeguards that would be in place when a judgement is rendered in the accused’s presence. Nonetheless, provided that strict conditions are adhered to, trials in absentia can be compatible with the accused’s right to be present. This article examines the standards that have been developed under international human rights law, providing for the normative framework, to see to what extent the trials in absentia of foreign terrorist fighters in the Netherlands and Belgium comply therewith. By pointing to analogies and contrasts, this article wishes to contribute to finding answers to this dilemma.