Although risk profiling can by no means be considered as a ‘new’ crime prevention tool, its application has gained popularity over the years. Both in the screening of asylum seekers, in border control at airports (e.g. behavioural profiling or the use of risk profiles in the European Passenger Information Unit) and in the designation of hotspots at the local level (e.g. the Crime Anticipation System), attempts are now being made to identify persons with criminal intentions more often on the basis of ordinal risk assessment tools. This sudden increase in popularity is not remarkable, since random police patrols or undirected security checks have long been shown to have negligible impact on crime reduction. Risk profiles, on the other hand, have a certain potential for shaping more effectively the interventions by law enforcement authorities at border crossing points. Nevertheless, the use of such profiles also raises some pertinent questions. It is precisely in the light of this ambivalence that the present theoretical contribution will consider the pitfalls and success factors of risk profiling during border checks, in order to determine when one can speak of ‘risk profiling’ and when the concept of ‘risky profiling’ must be used.

In this article we show how the concept of ‘institutional work’ can be used to study citizen participation in the field of security arrangements. Institutional work starts from the perspective of actors trying to influence security institutions, and not from the perspective of government (as concepts like the ‘participation society’ and ‘ladder’ do). As such, this dynamic concept can be a useful addition to the conceptual arsenal of security experts. By applying the concept to the case of the Voluntary Fire Brigade in nineteenth-century Utrecht (1879-1890) we show how institutional work can work in practice. Finally, we reflect on the contribution that institutional work can make to our understanding of citizen participation in the field of safety.

In the reduction of undermining crime in the Netherlands, the role of local government has become more important over the past decade. One of the means used for this is Article 13b of the Opium Act (the Damocles Act). That has evolved from a way of closing down local dealer properties to a means of disrupting the criminal drug world. In this article we analyse the developments that the application of the article has gone through. We make an inventory of the actual use of the article in a region known as one of the hotbeds of subversive crime in the Netherlands, the region of West and Central Brabant. Finally, we will discuss the consequences that application of the article has for the position of the mayor. Does this lead to a mayorship in which this officer becomes more of a ‘sheriff’ and less of a mayor? We show that this is not the case.

Litter in the street is a great annoyance for many people, especially in the large cities. This includes overflowing garbage containers caused by people incorrectly placing garbage: next to these containers. In this study, carried out in the municipality of Rotterdam, we have developed a model that provides insight into which factors contribute to where this is done (or not). In summary, days when people are not working, the number of people that depend on the container(s), the bonding and social cohesion of that group, and the social-economic circumstances of the people in that group are the most important factors in determining at which container locations people incorrectly place their garbage. These insights provide starting points for an effective municipal approach to overflowing garbage containers and thereby reducing the residents’ feelings of nuisance and unsafety.