Samenvatting

Against the background of a discussion of classical and modern concepts of punishment, the first implying the imposition of suffering as essence and the second encompassing all varieties of sanctions implying restrictions but not necessarily some form of suffering the author rejects the suggestion of the second concept, that punishment should be defined without any reference to imposing suffering. There are conceptual advantages to sticking to the classical definition of punishment, such as the fact that it is clearly differentiated from the concept of measurements, which are sanctions imposed without any demand of ‘guilt’ on the side of a perpetrator. Also there are good reasons to maintain the element of (imposition of ) ‘intended pain’ in the concept of punishment, but it is this element – the intentional imposition of pain and suffering – that makes the author reject the activity of punishing as unethical. Non-violent sanctions are conceivable and feasible and should on ethical grounds be preferred. This is explored with reference to the work of Tähtinen. In close connection with this idea the author argues that we should redefine criminal justice (in the Dutch language: ‘strafrecht’ meaning the right to punish and laws regarding punishment) to mean that it is the discipline that responds to crimes and offences, without any defining reference to punishment (‘misdaadrecht’, meaning the laws regarding ((responding to)) crime).