In the past decades, organised crime internationalised rapidly as a result of increasing mobility and ‘open’ borders. At the same time developments in information and communication technology have led to modernisation of existing types of crime and the introduction of novel ones. Finally, criminals have benefited from increasingly diversified migration streams. In the Netherlands and Belgium, organised crime appeared on the agenda in the 1990s. For a long time emphasis was on ‘trade crimes’ i.e. trafficking in drugs and humans, as well as human smuggling, followed by the production of synthetic drugs and cannabis. More recently the Low Countries are confronted by more visible manifestations of organised crime, for example rapid growth of outlaw motorcycle gangs. Criminals also try to utilise their capital to invest in businesses and real estate and to influence local politics.

The image that criminal enforcement of organized crime is difficult, is commonly reflected in the media and popular debate. Commentators often argue that organized crime is punished less severely than possible, due to the complexity of the offences, time constraints, and the increased interconnectedness between legal and illegal activities, which creates difficulties to find sufficient evidence to convict offenders. Using data from the Dutch Organized Crime Monitor, this article focuses on the ways in which offenders of organized crime are ‘treated’ by the criminal justice system and on the discrepancies between demanded sanctions and the actual sanctions executed in cases of organized crime.

Although the Netherlands criminalised some forms of labour exploitation as human trafficking, many cases remain undetected. This is probably due to low self-identification among victims. Whereas research revealed factors obstructing self-identification among victims, it remains unclear how some victims do arrive at self-identification. Drawing on in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with victims and professionals, this qualitative study identifies two ideal-typical pathways to self-identification. In the first trajectory self-identification is gradually formed through information gathering and deteriorating working conditions. In the second trajectory self-identification is triggered by a sudden vital event.

This paper uses social network analysis to study and compare the organizational structures and division of roles of three jihadist networks in the Netherlands. It uses unique Dutch police data covering the 2000-2013 period. This study demonstrates how the organizational structures differ between different networks. The earliest network has a hierarchical cell structure with a clear division of labour, while the later networks are horizontal and dense networks with less clear orientation on tasks. The core member types in the jihadist networks also differ. The earliest network contains international jihad veterans with clear leadership skills, while the later networks contain home-grown radicals with less status and often a lack of expertise. Furthermore, several jihadists evolve over time, when they used to be supporters, but become core members in posterior networks.

The concept of undermining or subversive crime seems to be linked undistinguishably to organized crime and both terms are sometimes used synonymously. Definitions of the phenomenon are sometimes based on its effects, while others have their focus on its manifestations. Discussion on the underlying causes is lacking. Regularly, activities that actually do not relate to undermining are labeled as such.
This reflection critically examines and evaluates the concept of undermining. The central question is what has to be understood under the concept of undermining and, above all: what not? The phenomenon is further explored, with the aim of stimulating scientific debate and empirical research. The role of the government and other institutions in facilitating undermining is explicitly discussed as well as the possibilities to strengthen their resilience.