Samenvatting

Self-regulation not always implies autonomy. Spontaneous self-regulation should be distinguished from commissioned self-regulation. The latter form of self-regulation is nowadays widespread and the result of outsourcing governmental activities. Outsourcing can be conceptualized in terms of Principal-Agent relations, in which the P commissions an A to realize P’s aims. In commissioned self-regulation the A is often constituted by the P and required to make rules in order to advance P’s aims. However, rule-making is not an activity which remains unaltered if it changes hands. In a context of spontaneous self-regulation rules fulfill a variety of functions. They guide actions and decision-making, they serve as both justification and as criticism of actions and decisions, and will thereby limit arbitrariness. In commissioned self-regulation, these manifold functions tend to be reduced to one dominant function: justifying performances towards P. In the latter capacity rules tend to be formalized and presented in a format that enables the P to arrive efficiently at a decision. Moreover, for the P the content of the rules matters less than their existence. The degree in which the external function of rules prevails determines not only how rules are presented but also how they are drafted and selected. The more A anticipates the perspective of P, the more autonomy risks to be undermined.