Visscher gives an overview of the empirical research on the deterrent effects of tort law within the domain of traffic accidents. An impressive amount of law and economics research has been done in the last few decades. This has resulted in special attention for the deterrent effects of the financial incentives which are embedded in various legal systems. Contradictory empirical evidence motivates Visscher to reflect on methodological issues. A major shortcoming of most studies is that the dependent and independent variables are not properly defined and distinguished. Another difficulty is to properly assess the influence of the introduction of the no-fault system on incentives: no-fault not only implies that the prevalence of the tort-system is more-or-less marginalised, but also that it transforms the extent to which the damages of those injured are covered by insurances in various ways. It is not easy to isolate both factors properly. Nevertheless, Visscher finds enough support in the empirical evidence to conclude that, without added financial deterrence incentives, no-fault schemes are likely to lead to increased accident rates, more injuries and more fatalities.

Van Velthoven and Van Wijck review empirical studies on the effects of tort law in the medical sector. The data they present comes mainly from the US, because from the 1970’s US states have enacted a variety of reforms in their tort systems. This variation has provided very useful data to study preventive effects. The empirical evidence analysed shows that medical malpractice risk affects the behaviour of health care providers. It has a negative impact on the supply of services and it encourages extra diagnostic testing;yet if the additional tests and procedures have any value, it is only a marginal one. Furthermore it has been found that changes in the supply of services do not affect health adversely. This suggests that the physicians who are driven out of business have a below average quality of performance. The authors conclude that, at the margin, medical liability law may have some social benefits after all.

Schwitters focuses on the differences between economic and a sociological perspectives on non-pecuniary damages. By exposing the alternative perspectives on this issue, he illuminates some methodological differences between both disciplines. Although law and economics has had a positive influence on empirical research, he questions the merits of this perspective when analysing non-pecuniary damages. Law and economics regards non-pecuniary damages exclusively as a financial incentive to realise optimal deterrence and maximisation of welfare. Alternatively, in sociology of law there is also attention for the symbolic dimension of law in which rules are seen as normative standards of behaviour. Compensation is a way to bring the wrongdoer to recognise that he has done wrong and has to compensate the victim, and to show the victim that his rights are taken seriously. Through a sociological lens, the adoption of an exclusively economic model of human behaviour has to be questioned. To what extent human behaviour is really influenced by either financial incentives or by normative standards of behaviour is an open empirical question. Finally, he argues that the decision to base our institutions (such as law) on economic underpinnings is a decision which itself cannot be based on an economic procedure of aggregating individual preferences and maximising welfare.

Elbers et al. studied the impact of being involved in a compensation process on the health of the claimant/plaintiff. Although there is some evidence that being involved has a negative effect on health, there is contradictory evidence concerning the explanatory factors. The authors review various empirical studies, pinpoint the contradictory conclusions and analyse their methodological strengths and weaknesses. Studies concerning the influence of claim settlement processes on the wellbeing of claimants offer insights from which suggestions can be derived for improvement of the position of claimants.