This article compares two studies on the compliance with judicial decisions and friendly settlements in Dutch civil court procedures. A new study (Eshuis 2009) finds a higher rate of compliance, which can largely be attributed to the selection of cases. The older study (Van Koppen & Malsch 1991) included a high number of default judgments, which are associated with a low level of compliance, while friendly settlements – associated with a high level of compliance – were excluded. The new study finds full compliance rates of 31% for default judgments, 74% for judgments in defended cases and 85% for friendly settlements. The high compliance with friendly settlements suggests these settlements are ‘better’ outcomes; however, the difference in compliance can well be explained by selection effects. Interviews reveal that many friendly settlements are not the harmonious solutions one might expect.
The new study finds no solid relation between compliance and procedural or distributive justice. In two relevant ways the conditions in the ‘real life’ judicial procedure are different from those in experimental research in which such relations are found. First, a large part of the non-compliance is caused by an inability of parties to comply. These participants may find the procedure and outcome fully ‘just’, but still won’t comply. Second, for those who can comply, there is no free choice on whether to comply or not. There are quite effective means of enforcement for such cases. So, those who can comply will, even if the procedure and its outcome are experienced as fully ‘unjust’.
The first part of the title of the article is a comment on Van Koppen and Malsch’s earlier research. They concluded that winning in court often was a Pyrrhic victory, and the loser would win after all. In the interviews however, few of those who do not comply were found to fit the image of a ‘winner’. The sad conclusion is that in judicial procedures winners and losers do not come in the same numbers; after all, it produces far more losers than winners.

The use and expenditure of the Legal Aid System is ever increasing. In addition, some people make use of the Legal Aid System more often than others. In fact, a small percentage of clients (2,6%) uses a substantial part (11,2%) of the legal aid. This paper sheds light on the occurrence of multiple use of legal aid and gives insight into the frequency and characteristics of multiple use.
In the research described in this article, we have made use of the data from 2000 until 2009 concerning legal aid that was provided by the Legal Aid Board. This dataset contains over 3 million cases (so-called certificates that are issued by the Board). The main difference between this research and other (paths to justice) studies is that the dataset contains actually provided legal aid and not self-reported problems by clients. Therefore, the representativeness is guaranteed and no false recollections can occur. At the same time, this means that the research is limited to people who are entitled to legal aid (approximately 39% of the Dutch population) and have actually received a certificate.
The results show that the provision of legal aid leads to new cases for which legal aid is again provided. Also, certain certificates coincide with and act as a trigger for certain other certificates. In the discussion we clarify the significance and implications of the results that are presented. Furthermore, we discuss the recently ordered budget cut in legal aid in the Netherlands. We describe ways to decrease the use and expenditure of the Legal Aid System, some of which are already implemented in the system. Finally, we discuss possible other (non-legal) problems that can be experienced by multiple users of the Legal Aid System.

Since the national legal systems and legal cultures diverse, the question is raised whether the jurisprudence should concern itself more with the legal cultural context of a given meta-legal study. The issues and outcomes of a particular legal socio-philosophical study carry the problems and problematizations that are relevant for the societal, legal and academic world of the scholar concerned. Scholars such as John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum and Richard Posner may deserve to join the first ranks of the American academic world, but what is their contribution to the issues and debates of the European legal cultures and the Dutch legal culture in particular? A plea is made for more diversity in selecting and reading the works of scholars from abroad. In demonstrating the need for diversity the work of Alain Supiot is discussed.

For many legal scholars it goes without saying that legal and legal-philosophical theories originate in specific societal contexts and that this contextual character should always be taken into consideration. This implies, for example, that we should take the differences between the common law and civil law tradition seriously. This paper acknowledges the importance of such differences for legal analysis in general, but argues that this acknowledgement is less urgent for legal-philosophical analyses, since they primarily focus on what both traditions share, namely, a foundation in liberal-democratic principles.

My current research concerns contemporary judicial practices in Tunisia. I focus on what I call ‘delicate fields of law’, such as domestic violence, unmarried cohabitation, children born out of wedlock, virginity, abortion, etc. Such topics are delicate in any given society, as they are related to a fundamental ‘symbolic order’ (Françoise Héritier). Because of their sensitive character, the legislation concerning these topics is generally characterized by vague and open norms, leaving much interpretational freedom to judges. My research examines how Tunisian judges deal with these discretionary powers.
I conducted fieldwork in Tunis for a period of fourteen months (2008-2009), when I collected court decisions, attended court hearings and interviewed judges, lawyers and litigants. To treat these empirical data, I developed a non-culturalist approach that is both praxiological and ethnomethodological.
My research is praxiological as I treat legal practice as an object of investigation in itself (en tant que tel, Dupret), instead of using legal practice as a medium to study society (‘mirror thesis’, Tamanaha). This means that I describe how Tunisian judges apply open norms in delicate fields of law, without interpreting from a meta-level why judges apply the law in one way or another. However, this does not mean that my study remains merely descriptive. For the interpretation of what judges do, I follow the ethnomethodological approach.