Samenvatting

In this article, the author defends two propositions related to the concepts of free will and criminal responsibility. Free will is defined as the capability of distancing oneself from one’s immediate surroundings and reflect on impulses. The first proposition is that it is a mistake to suppose – as do many neuroscientists adhering to objectivist theories on the human mind – that the concept of free will refers to a postulated natural phenomenon, the existence of which could, in principle, be established or falsified. Instead, the concept of free will constitutes a practice; it is a human artefact that is part and parcel of the differing means by which mankind structures intersubjective life. The second proposition is that the criminal law legitimately presupposes that persons normally act out of free will and that they, consequently, are morally responsible and accountable for the wrongful actions they perform. The author claims that his arguments for both propositions are supported by insights from the neuroscientific fields of connectionism and embodied cognition.